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management system's imminent threat to their reasonable use was
insufficient to establish standing, and the court dismissed their takings
claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Based on this dismissal,
the court similarly dismissed the Knausts' state law claims without
prejudice, declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.
The Knausts' regulatory takings claim resulted from the Business
Park's alleged interference with their plans to construct a commercial
mushroom farm.
The Business Park's two-level storm water
management system discharged only benign, contaminant-free,
treated storm water not subject to EPA regulation. The district court
noted that the Knausts failed to produce any evidence of
contamination.
In fact, the Knausts admitted that they neither
collected runoff samples for laboratory analysis, nor did they detect
contamination in any water samples from the subterranean lakes.
Further, the Knausts did not offer proof that the water management
system failed to remove the contaminants it was designed to eliminate.
Despite lacking subject matter jurisdiction because collateral
estoppel precluded claims regarding the Knausts' ownership interest
in the subterranean caves and the waters therein, the court addressed
the merits of the takings claim. The court granted the City summary
judgment because the Knausts could not support a takings claim
against water they did not own, and because they produced no
evidence that the Business Park's alleged contamination sufficiently
threatened their reasonable use, causing "actual or imminent injury."
Ripeness problems mandated the takings claim dismissal, because the
Knausts never applied to the City for a zoning change permitting the
development.
Until that occurrence, the court was unable to
determine the zoning law's economic impact on the Knausts, and its
interference "with reasonable investment-backed expectations"crucial elements in takings analysis.
Robert Lykos
FD&P Enters., Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 993500, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 497 (D.N.J. Jan. 15, 2003) (holding the
appropriate test forjurisdiction under the Clean Water Act was
whether there is a substantial nexus, beyond a mere hydrological
connection, between the property and a navigable body of water; and
jurisdiction over the filling of wetlands in order to build a commercial
facility to further interstate freight transportation was not violative of
the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution because it was
an activity that would "substantially affect" interstate commerce).
FD&P Enterprises ("FD&P") provided freight transportation to the
New York-New Jersey metropolitan area. FD&P owned 100 acres of
wetlands in Jersey City, New Jersey, the western perimeter bordering
Penhorn Creek, a non-navigable tributary of the Hackensack River, a
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navigable body of water utilized for interstate commerce.
On
December 18, 1992, FD&P applied to the United States Army Corps of
Engineers ("Corps") for a permit under the Clean Water Act ("CWA")
to fill 53.5 acres of its wetlands and build an intermodal facility.
On June 23, 1999, after seven years of failed negotiations, FD&P
brought this action against the Corps in the United States District
Court of New Jersey alleging the Corps lacked jurisdiction over the
wetlands on the FD&P Property; and if the Corps' had jurisdiction over
the FD&P wetlands, it would violate the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution.
On the first count, FD&P moved for summaryjudgment. The issue
presented was whether the Corps had jurisdiction under the CWA over
the wetlands on the FD&P Property that were adjacent to a nonnavigable tributary that fed into a navigable body of water. The CWA
granted the Corps authority to issue permits for the discharge of
material into "navigable waters of the United States."
Originally, the courts interpreted the statute broadly to permit
regulation of wetlands adjacent to non-navigable tributaries that fed
navigable bodies of water. However, in 2001, the Supreme Court held
a significant nexus between the wetlands and the "navigable" waters
was necessary to determine jurisdiction under the CWA in Solid Waste
Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs ("SWANCC').
Although the Court recognized the ponds at issue in SWANCC were
hydrologically connected to navigable waters, it declined to find a
sufficient nexus between the two isolated waters to allow the CWA's
regulation.
The SWANCC decision caused confusion about the scope of the
CWA and a split of authority represented by the Fifth and Ninth
Circuits. The Fifth Circuit interpreted SWANCC to permit the CWA to
regulate a body of water if it was actually navigable or adjacent to an
open, navigable body of water. On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit
interpreted SWANCC only to apply to "isolated waters," and
maintained that non-navigable tributaries of navigable waters were
subject to jurisdiction under the CWA. After noting the CWA's
valuable purpose, the court concluded the appropriate test for the
CWA's jurisdiction in the instant case was whether there was a
substantial nexus, beyond a mere hydrological connection, between
the FD&P Property and the navigable waters of the Hackensack River.
The Corps argued FD&P's wetlands were sufficiently related to the
Hackensack River and the company's plan to fill the wetlands would
release greater levels of sediments and chemicals and damage the
river. FD&P contended their wetlands provided no environmental
benefit to the Hackensack River and denied the filling of the wetlands
would cause any damage to the river.
Because the evidence put forth by both parties generated a
genuine issue of material fact as to a substantial nexus between the
FD&P Property and the Hackensack River, and the effect the filling of
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the wetlands would have on the river, the court denied FD&P's motion
for summary judgment.
On the second count regarding the violation of the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution, the court stated that
Congress may regulate three categories of activity under its commerce
power: (1) channels of interstate commerce; (2) instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, or persons and things in interstate commerce;
and (3) activities that "substantially affect" interstate commerce.
Although FD&P asserted filling its wetlands would not "substantially
affect" interstate commerce, the court found FD&P's plan to fill their
wetlands to build a commercial facility to further interstate freight
transportation to suffice as "substantially affecting" interstate
commerce. Therefore, the court held the Corps' jurisdiction over the
FD&P Property would not violate the Commerce Clause of the United
States Constitution.
JessicaL. Grether
Bailey v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, Civ. No. 02-639, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23272 (D. Minn. Nov. 21, 2002) (holding that a
restoration order, after the denial of an after-the-fact permit for the
building of an access road which included dredging and filling
wetlands, does not give rise to pre-enforcementjudicial review until all
existing state procedures are exhausted).
Gary Bailey ("Bailey") sought judicial review in the United States
District Court for the District of Minnesota of decisions made by the
United States Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps"), state agencies
("MPCA") and Lake of the Woods County ("County"), as well as
compensation for the alleged taking of property in violation of the
Fifth Amendment. The Corps, MPCA and the County brought
motions to dismiss and the court granted each.
Bailey owned a parcel of lakefront property in northern
Minnesota. The land included wetlands adjacent to navigable waters
and fell under the jurisdiction of the Corps pursuant to the Clean
Water Act ("CWA"). Bailey submitted a plat to the County for a
residential development and before the plat was approved, he began
building an access road across the land by dredging and filling
wetlands. He then applied for an "after-the-fact" permit for the project
from the Corps and submitted a wetland "replacement" plan because
the project would drain and fill the wetlands. The Corps rejected the
permit because the lots did not have sufficient areas of upland and the
land was insufficient for locating individual sewage treatment systems
that would comply with state regulations. The Corps directed Bailey to
remove the road and the Department of Natural Resources directed
Bailey to restore the wetlands to the lot. Bailey did not comply with
the order and the Corps did not seek enforcement of the order.

